Practicing Stalls is a Waste of Time

13 Answers

1. 
   

   
   

   James MacGregor CFI on Jun 06, 2011

   agreed, heck back in the day you had to be able to spin an aircraft and recover within 15 degrees of your original heading. 

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   NozeDive on Jun 06, 2011

   I won’t put any statistics here, but as a pilot, I’d rather know, from first hand experience, how to recover from a stall, how the aircraft handles in a stall, what a stall feels like / looks like / sounds like before during and after, and how to minimize altitiude loss.

   Same goes for spins.

   I think there are many pilots/students who are too timid to become comfortable and well aquainted with their aircraft in these attitudes and situations. I also think there are many pilots/students who should spend their time doing something other than flying.

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   MaggotCFII on Jun 06, 2011

   Maybe this article from Aviation Week will be helpful in addressing practicing stall training.  It’s long apoplgies – but worth the read.
    
   Subject: Fwd: AviationWeek AF 447 article

   Aviation Week
    
    
   Subj: AviationWeek AF 447 article

    

   Air France Crash Suggests Inadequate TrainingJun 5, 2011 

   By Jens Flottau, Robert WallFrankfurt, London

   The focus of the investigation into why Air France Flight 447 crashed into the Atlantic a year ago is starting to change now that safety experts have begun evaluating information from the Airbus A330-200’s flight recorders.
   Questions surrounding human factors are moving into the spotlight as the investigation further unfolds, with concerns of turbulent weather and pitot-tube icing shifting into the background.
   French accident investigation agency BEA released a three-page memo May 27 containing factual information excerpts that is likely to be followed by a more in-depth interim report within the next few weeks, possibly by the end of this month. The final report is not expected until 2012; it should also address concerns raised by some about technical problems with the A330.
   Initial analysis of the flight data and cockpit voice recorders is revealing more about what caused AF447 to crash on June 1, 2009: The aircraft stalled at 38,000 ft. and was never recovered. The sequence of events suggests that proper stall recovery procedures could have prevented the accident.
   Inflight loss-of-control accidents were the most frequent cause of fatal airliner crashes and by far the deadliest in 2000-09. Of the 89 fatal accidents recorded in the period, 20 were attributed to inflight loss of control; 16 were caused by controlled flight into terrain.
   Recent crashes linked to stalls include that of the Colgan Air Bombardier Q400 on approach to Buffalo, N.Y. (2009); Turkish Airlines Boeing 737-800 in short final for Amsterdam (2009); West Caribbean Airways MD-82 in Venezuela (2005); Thomsonfly Boeing 737-300 near Bournemouth, England (2007); and XL Airways Germany Airbus A320 off the coast of Perpignan, France (2009).
   “Most approach-to-stall incidents and accidents occur with sufficient altitude available for the recovery,” Boeing Senior Safety Pilot Mike Coker told delegates at the Flight Safety Foundation’s European Aviation Safety Seminar in Istanbul this year. “Incidents progress to accidents when the crew fails to make a positive recovery after the stall warning occurs.”
   Flawed training is partly to blame, he asserts. Approach-to-stall training is typically conducted at simulated altitudes of 5,000-10,000 ft., but many stalls actually happen much higher. In the case of AF447, stalls occurred at 35,000 ft. and 38, 000 ft., respectively. That has important, negative implications, Coker concludes.
   “Recovery stresses an increase to maximum thrust and recovery with minimal altitude loss,” he says. Therefore, “students try to minimize the nose-down pitch change while engines spool up.”
   To make matters worse, engine margins at high altitude are much smaller than at lower flight levels, where pilots can count on a much greater response to power increases. Also, Coker says, “it is probable when pilots remain on a particular model for extended periods of time that their exposure to approach-to-stall indications and recovery occur as infrequently as once in a decade,” when stall exercises should really be part of recurring training. He stresses that training should focus on correct procedures, reducing the angle of attack and appropriate energy awareness, and not so much on minimizing altitude loss.
   Airbus and Boeing have worked together to devise new procedures for stall recovery that emphasize angle of attack rather than preserving altitude.
   As far as AF447 crew coordination is concerned, there are at least two indications that there may have been problems. The pilot non-flying (PNF), a 37-year-old with 6,547 total hours and 4,479 hr. on type, tried several times to call back the captain, who was on an agreed break; at the time, the pilot flying (PF), the 32-year-old junior copilot with 2,936 flying hours and 807 hr. on type, continued to pull back his side-stick at Flight Level 380 with thrust set to takeoff/go around, the angle of attack increasing further and speed decreasing. The two pilots also made simultaneous control inputs (pitch up) at around 20,000 ft. and an estimated sink rate of more than 10,000 ft. per minute.
   Air France’s training and crew coordination standards will therefore likely be another target for recommendations; the airline already has undertaken an outside audit, conducted by Delta Air Lines representatives, of its safety procedures. In spite of the new evidence, the airline states that “the crew, made up of three skilled pilots, demonstrated a totally professional attitude and were committed to carrying out their task to the very end.”
   The sequence of events in the crash that killed all 228 people onboard the flight from Rio de Janeiro to Paris can be segmented into two distinct phases. In the first phase, the pilots were dealing with the failure of speed readings that are almost certain to be linked to iced-over pitot tubes. The second phase began when speed indications returned to normal and the aircraft was at the edge of its flight envelope but under control and not stalled. Phase two also coincided with the captain’s return to the cockpit from an agreed-upon rest.
   The initial chain of events was kicked off by erroneous speed readings at 2:10:05 (UTC), when both the primary flight display and integrated standby instrument system (ISIS) showed a sharp fall from 275 kt. to just 60 kt. The autopilot and auto-thrust disengaged and the flight management system switched to alternate law. The aircraft rolled to the right and the PF reacted by making a nose-up and left input. The stall warning sounded twice.
   The nose-up inputs led the aircraft to climb fast, at a rate of up to 7,000 ft. per minute, but it almost leveled off at a slight climb of around 700 ft. per minute and Flight Level FL375. At 4 deg., the angle of attack was only slightly higher than in cruise flight (3 deg.). The return to normal of the primary speed indication after 40 sec., and after close to 1 min. on the ISIS, indicates the pitot tubes started to transmit valid data again and the icing issue appeared to have subsided.
   At this stage, the event could have been over, with the aircraft still in alternate law and manual control but stabilized. There appears to be no technical, aerodynamic or meteorological reason that would have kept it from returning to its previously assigned altitude (FL350) by simply applying nose-down stick-forward control inputs.
   But then things went terribly wrong. At 2:10:50, the PF continued to provide nose-up inputs, causing the trimmable horizontal stabilizer to go to 13 deg. nose-up from 3 deg. nose-up. The airspeed began decreasing, to 185 kt., and the angle of attack reached 16 deg.
   Gerhard Huettig, a professor of aeronautics at the Berlin Technical University, says the change in the horizontal stabilizer position was due to a software malfunction that could have been neither recognized nor corrected by the pilots and was a key factor as to why they were unable to fly out of the subsequent stall. He consequently asserts that the entire A330 fleet should be grounded until the software is corrected. However, industry officials point out that the automatic trim only became active after the crew pulled back on the stick and that it worked as expected.
   In this phase, the captain re-entered the cockpit. What role he played subsequently is not clear yet, because the full cockpit voice recorder content has not been published. According to one report, he immediately told his two copilots that they were in a stall and therefore should put the aircraft’s nose down and reduce thrust. Others doubt that because there was hardly any nose-down control input in the remaining 3 min. of flight and from 38,000 ft. to sea level.
   In fact, forward speed declined so much that even stall warnings stopped, in spite of the fact that the aircraft remained in a stalled situation for the remainder of its flight. That only happens when measured speeds are below 60 kt. and angle-of-attack values are considered invalid. When speed drops below 30 kt., that is also registered by the flight management system as invalid—and that is what seems to have occurred 30 sec. later, as the PF stated, “I don’t have any more indications” and the PNF replied, “We have no valid indications.” That second instrument failure is thus most likely due to the slow speed and not linked to pitot-tube icing.
   Around 2.5 min. before impact, there was one short period in which the PF did the right thing by pushing the side-stick forward. The angle of attack decreased and speeds became valid again, with the stall warning returning and indicating an acceleration in horizontal speed. The stall warning may have caused the PF to pull back on the stick again, repeating his previous pattern; it was not corrected by either the PNF or the captain. “[The pilots] never made the inputs necessary to recover,” says one official close to the investigation.
   “We will learn a lot from this accident,” says William R. Voss, president and CEO of the Flight Safety Foundation, who believes that AF447 should have fundamental consequences for the content of pilot training globally. “We are still training [for] the engine fire at V1, but the complexity of automated systems has grown. We have to develop crews that can deal with incidents such as QF32,” the Qantas Airbus A380 that suffered an uncontained engine failure after takeoff in Singapore on Nov. 4, 2010, and returned to the airport severely damaged.
   Voss argues that AF447 would not have crashed if the aircraft had been of an older generation. “Highly automated aircraft have saved many lives, but they fail differently than aircraft of 20 years ago,” he says. He sees it as a “failure of the industry” that pilot training has not kept in step with the latest aircraft technologies. He also argues for improved upset recovery training, as “we are not explicitly training that” and the AF447 A330 “seems to have had pitch-and-roll authority all the way down to the water.”
   The focus on the pilots is not likely to have an immediate impact on the legal landscape. Steve Marks, an attorney with Miami-based Podhurst Orseck, who represents 41 families of AF447 victims, notes that investigative reports like this “tend to focus on pilot conduct,” adding that “in this case, there is no doubt the pilot confusion is linked directly to the failure of the pitot tubes.” Marks is bringing a case against the companies involved in the A330 navigation system. On June 3, a San Francisco judge was due to hear arguments on whether the case could be brought in the U.S., or if the liability claims must be made in French court. If it is the latter, plaintiffs would have to wait until the judicial inquiry in France is complete, which, as in the case of the Concorde crash, could take years.
   The BEA report plays down two other issues that have been in the spotlight. One is speculation that the aircraft entered a severe storm; the BEA document suggests it was merely turbulence that is standard for that region. During a crew briefing 2 hr. into the flight, in which all three pilots participated, the PF said that “the little bit of turbulence that you just saw, . . . we should find the same ahead . . . . We’re in the cloud layer. Unfortunately, we can’t climb much for the moment because the temperature is falling more slowly than forecast.” And 11 min. later, the PF told the captain that “in two minutes, we should enter an area where it’ll move about a bit more than at the moment. You should watch out,” adding that “I’ll call you as soon as we’re out of it.” The PNF proposed 2 min. later that “you can maybe go a little to the left” and the aircraft turned left 12 deg. None of the actions suggest anything out of the ordinary.
   The second speculation surrounded pitot-tube icing. Although the pitot probes appear to have iced over, the speed discrepancy between the primary flight display and ISIS lasted around 45 sec., not atypical for the phenomenon.
   There remain some long-term questions related to the AF447 accident. Would better aural cues help focus pilot attention on recovering from a stall? One industry official doubts replacing the “stall” alert with a more specific instruction, such as “push stick,” would make much of a difference. And should research be funded toward devising a better backup mechanism to pitot tubes or finding another way to determine true air space that is less susceptible to outside environmental factors? “It would be interesting to have another technology,” the industry official says.

    
    

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4. 
   

   
   

   Pat Flannigan on Jun 06, 2011

   Here’s the full quote from J. Mac McClellan’s article: 
    
    
   “When it comes to “artificial” practice 
   maneuvers to re-establish your currency 
   I find most maneuvers to be useless. 
   Unless you are an aerobatic pilot where 
   the stall is fundamental to many maneu- 
   vers, I think practicing stall recovery is 
   among the biggest wastes of pilot time. I 
   think it is so much more useful to learn 
   how, and to practice regularly, attitude 
   and airspeed control so you don’t come 
   close to a stall rather than intentionally 
   flying an airplane into a stall.”
    

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5. 
   

   
   

   Pat Flannigan on Jun 06, 2011

   I understand what Mac is saying, and I’m inclined to agree with the general idea that stall avoidance should be key. But recent events have shown the importance of stall recovery – namely the crash of Colgan 3407 and the aforementioned Air France Flight 447.
    
   In each case, professional pilots with years of training and experience did not reduce the angle of attack to recover from a stall. In fact, the Colgan Crash saw the opposite – a stiff pitch up at full power while retracting the flaps.
    
   I feel these accidents highlight the need for continued practice and proficiency in both stall avoidance and recovery.
    
   Sorry Mac, I have to disagree with you on this one.

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   Andrew K on Jun 06, 2011

   I don’t think practicing stalls is a waste of time.  Anytime a pilot can practice an unusual operation or emergency the more prepared he/she will be when the real time comes.
   With that being said, the way stalls are performed today are more like a procedural manuever and are too predicable which reduces their training value. So, more emphasis should be put on upset recovery training.  I have a feeling that’s why spin clinics are popular.
    

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   Matthew Waugh on Jun 06, 2011

   I agree with the article.
    
   First of all don’t confuse airline transport training and stall recovery with general aviation stall recovery. We’re taught to power out of the stall and hold altitude. Didn’t work for Colgan, didn’t work for Air France, but that’s the training. So all the Cessna drivers saying “dumb airline pilots, don’t even know how to recover from a stall are barking up the wrong tree”.
    
   Stall training is an interesting exercise in aircraft control, it’s should certainly be taught, but whether it needs to be part of currency training is, in my opinion, not clear, and I would agree with the article, work on other more important stuff.
    
   Reasonable people can differ – as I’m sure they will.

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   James MacGregor on Jun 06, 2011

   Whenever I give someone a BFR I base it off what type if flying they do, anything they want to work on etc…

   No matter what I always include, steep turns, stalls to the buffet (normal and cross controlled) and a simulated engine/flap failure landing.

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   Micah on Jun 06, 2011

   Interesting article, but it bites off a bit more than can be chewed in one read. If the author’s point is: “[Insert CFI’s name] can’t take a rusty, hasn’t flown in 18 months, pilot and make him/her “current” with a few stalls and falls,” then I agree with that. But after 10-15 hours I think I could work this pilot close to his/her former skill level.
    
   Does that mean that I won’t teach stall recovery to my students, or review this skill when flying a BFR with an unknown pilot? Absolutely not! Stall recovery is a fundamental skill (and helps display other fundamental skills). I can’t force a pilot to make good decisions when flying, but I can help that pilot develop the skills that will afford them the time needed to make good decisions when needed.
    
   Regarding the Colgan Buffalo crash, icing-related stalls are probably not a good comparison to what we’re discussing here. Also, there is some indication (unless I’ve read incorrectly or new evidence contradicts this idea) that an elevator stall was involved and, although I’m not trained in the Dash, I understand that elevator stall recovery has counterintuitive procedures. Then again, the chief error in this event may be related to flying into severe icing without paying enough attention to the details (including flying the AP too long).

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    Pat Flannigan on Jun 06, 2011

    In response to Micah, tailplane stall recovery is contrary to normal stall recovery because the tailplane is an upside-down wing. But recovery is almost automatic. As the tail stalls, the nose drops steeply and rapidly. The gut reaction is to pull up, which reduces angle of attack on the tail.

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    Wes Beard on Jun 06, 2011

    I think practicing stalls in the traditional method is pointless but I don’t think practicing like they may happen in real life is pointless.  In the very beginning traditional stalls are a necessary skill to develop for a student pilot.  I’m talking about practicing stalls when you are already at least a private pilot.
     
    Traditionally, we all go up to altitude and run through the stall series (takeoff, departure and approach).  Running through the exercises becomes an exercise in pitch control.  Slowly raising the nose of the airplane to keep altitude, airspeed bleeds off and the stall happens.  We really on refresh ourselvces on the three clues to an approaching stall and that is it.
     
    Scenario Based Training instead accomplishes those stalls in a given scenario.  For example, practicing stalls at your crusing altitude.  Imagine going on a cross country with the autopilot on, you look down to figure out where you are or update your flight plan and the throttle slowly works its way out.  Before you know it, the stall horn sounds and the autopilot kicks out.  If you are high enough, you won’t be able to keep altitude and accelerate out of the stall.  Imagine shooting an instrument approach to MDA minimums and breaking out looking for the airport and forgetting to add power on the level off.  The more we can associates stalls with real world examples the better the training event is going to be for the pilot.

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    Earl Kessler on Jun 07, 2011

    I recently had a student with landing trouble.  I teach (like most of you) that a good landing is a stall a few inches from the ground.

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    Ron Amundson on Jun 07, 2011

    In a lot of ways, this parallels the discussions of spin training for the PPL during the 70’s… where in it was removed. Stalls are a different animal though… I dont know how many stories informal hanger flying where in a PPL ended up way behind the a/c and just about bought the farm. Likewise, how many stall spin accidents on final were averted, as the pilot picked up enough clues from other than the A/S indicator.
    I mirror @Wes comment as concerns scenario based training though. Academic stall practice in isolation is a help for sure, but its no where near as beneficial as real time application. Now, if only I could get a simulated 6 yr old with projectile vomit capability 🙂

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